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PRACTICAL LEGAL REMEDIES TO THE PUBLIC 
BEACH SHORTAGE 
James F. Lafargue* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over one half of the population of the United States lives in the 
10% of the nation's land area lying closest to the coastline. I This 
concentration, coupled with an increase in individual leisure time 
and mobility,2 has made shoreline areas an increasingly important 
recreational resource.3 
Although all American jurisdictions recognize the right of the 
public to use coastal waters for navigation, fishing, and commerce, 
to swim in public waters, and to walk on the foreshore,4 wide diver-
gence exists as to whether the public has the right to use the pri-
vately owned littoral property5 between the high and low water 
marks.s In many parts of the country inability of the public to gain 
access to these areas has led to a shortage of public beaches, and 
an increase in attempts to gain access to nonpublic beaches. 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AH'AIRS. 
I S. REP. No. 733, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1972). Since 1940, population on all coasts has 
increased faster than the population in general. The increase has been most dramatic on the 
Pacific coast, where the population nearly tripled between 1940 and 1970. U.S. BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT m' THE UNITED STATES (93d ed. 1972). Of the 33 Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas of one million persons or more, 23 of them (including all of 
the eight largest metropolitan areas) lie on the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, 
or on one of the Great Lakes. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
CHARACTERISTICS m' THE POPULATION 36 (1970). 
2 M. CLAWSON & J. KNETSCH, OUTDOOR RECREATION 32 (1966). 
" In 1970,43"; of the United States population swam an average of 21 days during the year. 
BUREAU m' OUTDOOR RECREATION, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 1970 SURVEY OF OUTDOOR RECREATION 
ACTIVITIES, PRELIMINARY REPORT (1972). 
, The foreshore is the wet-sand area, or the area seaward of the mean low tide line. See, 
e,g., Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974). 
, Littoral property is land which borders the ocean. 
• This area, from mean low tide to the vegetation line, is often referred to as the dry-sand 
area. 
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In analyzing these attempts, this article will discuss the nature 
and causes of the beach shortage and the various legal remedies 
successfully employed in the recent wave of litigation directed at 
opening more of the nation's beaches. These remedies include appli-
cation of the common law doctrines of public trust, dedication, and 
custom, which may operate at the expense of the private property 
owner, and eminent domain, which, in contrast, requires compensa-
tion to the owner for the interest taken in his land. Noncoercive 
statutory remedies, involving incentives to private land owners to 
provide public beach access, will also be discussed. It will be shown 
that no single legal doctrine provides the answer to the public beach 
crisis, but that the legal theory most useful in opening new beaches 
varies with the facts at hand. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS PROBLEM-GEOGRAPHICAL, 
SOCIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 
Public right of access to ocean beaches is undisputedly a state law 
issue.7 Although in some jurisdictions access to all beaches is an 
established right, 8 in most coastal states, beach availability depends 
on whether or not one owns property on the oceanfront or in a 
municipality which maintains a beach for its residents. Although 
such ownership is costly in terms of high land prices and property 
taxes, the demand for both littoral and nonlittoral land in coastal 
communities is great. The result is that less than 6% of the United 
States recreational shoreline remains available for use by the gen-
eral public.9 Public access to many of the best recreational beaches 
is limited by the resultant prohibitive costs, and also by the location 
7 Each state has sovereignty over its tidelands, except where the lands were granted by a 
prior sovereign before the state was admitted to the union, Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 
290 (1967), or are subject to a prior trust, Borax Conso!. Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 
(1935), or have been condemned by the United States, Coupland v. Morton, 5 E. L. R. 20504 
(E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1975), aft'd, 5 E.L.R. 20507 (4th Cir. July 7, 1975). 
, See State ex rei. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969) discussed in text at 
notes 64-73, infra. 
, In total, the nation has 59,157 miles of detailed shoreline, including the Great Lakes, of 
which 21,724 miles are usable for recreation but only 1,209 miles are open to the public. 117 
CONGo REc. 1880, Table 4 (1971). Ironically, Florida, with its high ratio of coastline to land 
area, exemplifies the public beach shortage problem. Of Florida's 2,665 miles of shoreline, 
1,078 miles are beaches but only 161 miles are publicly owned recreation areas. In Miami 
Beach there are solid miles of shoreline to which access is blocked by huge buildings which 
are so close to the ocean that the entire beach is covered by water at high tide. H.R. Doc. 
No. 25, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1973), quoting the Miami Herald, April 22, 1973. Further-
more, the major portion of the public recreational shoreline consists of marshes, bluffs, and 
rocky beaches. 117 CONGo REc. 1880-81, Table 5 (1971). 
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of these beaches, frequently far from urban population centers.1f1 
The consequent low ratio of usable public beach to population con-
tinues to decrease as demand increases and available beach facili-
ties do not. As a result, public beaches during peak-use periods 
typically are severely overcrowded, II impose daily user or parking 
fees, and are difficult to reach because access roads and highways 
are congested with traffic. 12 The potential for ecological harm result-
ing from intensive use of the very limited public beach facilities is 
obvious. 13 
The public beach shortage is further exacerbated by the practice 
of municipal beach proprietors, particularly in the Northeast, of 
discriminating against nonresidents. With the increase in demand 
for beach facilities in recent years, many shoreline communities 
have shifted to policies restricting beaches to resident use14 or charg-
ing substantial fees to nonresident users.15 These high fees put use 
of the beach beyond the financial means of many nonresident fami--
lies, in effect preventing them from using the beach at all. Though 
such a beach may be classified as public, for the purposes of most 
nonresidents, the beach is private and restricted. 18 Many coastal 
'"~ Further, the coastal beaches most accessible to large numbers of people are commonly 
the most polluted. Boston Globe, April 27, 1975, at B6, col. 1. 
\I Note, Access to Public Municipal Beaches: the Formulation of a Comprehensive Legal 
Approoch, 7 Sun"'OLK L. REv. 936 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Access to Public Municipal 
Beaches]. 
12 Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke, U.S. Army Chief of Engineers, told the American Shore 
and Beach Preservation Ass'n on Sept. 11, 1969: "Seekers of outdoor recreation are ... 
creating 50-mile-Iong weekend traffic jams reaching all the way from Boston to Cape 
Cod .... " 1 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 155-56 (1970) . 
• :0 MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 6611, 35 (1975). 
" For example, Osterville Beach on Cape Cod excludes all nonresidents (no fee is charged 
to residents and taxpayers). MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 5302, 17 (1975). The town of Scituate, 
Mass. requires a resident sticker as a prerequisite to use of the town parking lot. There is no 
parking for nonresidents of Scituate at all, effecting total exclusion indirectly. [d. at 11. See 
al.~o, Comment, Non-Re.~ident Re.~trictions in Municipally Owned Beaches: Approaches to 
the Problem, 10 COLUM. J. Qt' L. & Soc. PROBS. 177 (1974). 
15 These may also include restrictions and charges on nonresident parking. MASS. H.R. 
Doc. No. 6611, 27 (1975). For example, the town of Yarmouth, Mass. charges its residents 
$10.00 a season for the sticker required to use the town beach. The charge for nonresidents, 
however, is $10.00 per week. MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 5302, 17-18 (1972). In 1972, the New York 
Times reported that Westport, Conn. charged its residents $8.00 per season for parking at 
Compo Beach, while nonresidents were charged $15.00 per day. Damton, Suburbs Stiffening 
Beach Curbs, New York Times, July 10, 1972, at 25, cols. 5-6, cited in Note, Access to Public 
Municipal Beache.~, supra note 11, at 938-39, n.7. 
" The purpose of nonresident fees is not always exclusionary. In some instances they 
represent a forced subsidy by nonresidents not only of the beaches to which access is gained, 
but in some instances of the beaches to which access is denied. They may even be used to 
cover town expenses unrelated to beaches. MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 6611, 113 (1975). 
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communities continue to exact these fees despite the fact that their 
economy is dependent on the tourism-related income generated by 
nonresident beach users.17 
The validity of such discrimination in access to city beaches has 
been upheld in some jurisdictions. For instance, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court upheld a state statute which allowed cities and 
towns to charge suitable user fees, and exempt their own residents 
if they wished. IS In New Jersey, however, municipalities are forbid-
den to discriminate on the basis of residence in allowing access to 
their beaches. In the case of Brindley v. Lavallette,19 the New Jersey 
Superior Court applied the unique rule that ". . . discrimination 
against nonresidents in an ordinance invalidates it, excepting possi-
ble special circumstances which would justify the discrimination."20 
This rule was extended in Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea 21 to 
prohibit a town from charging higher fees to nonresidents for the use 
of its shorelines. Thus differential fee charges, as well as outright 
exclusion of nonresidents,' are barred in New Jersey.22 
The common law nondiscrimination rule seems to exist only in 
New Jersey. Most other states allow discrimination in beach access. 
Even in states where discrimination is permissible, however, it will 
not foreclose access in areas where the general public has previously 
acquired irrevocable legal rights to use the beach property in ques-
tion.23 For this reason, all other reported beach-access discrimina-
17 [d. 
" Jackvony v. Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 21 A.2d 554 (1941). Residents may only be exempted from 
admission fees. Other charges for beach facilities (e.g., bathhouses) must be uniform, reflect-
ing an apparent compromise in policy. Pub!. L. 1939, c. 759, as amended by Pub!. L. 1949, c. 
2245, which requires admission to Easton's Beach in Newport to be free to all. 
" 33 N.J. Super. 344, 110 A.2d 157 (Law Div. 1954), striking down Borough of Lavallette 
Ordinance No. 166, which prohibited persons from using the borough's beach without a 
license and provided that nonresidents of Lavallette could not receive a license. 
211 [d. at 349, 110 A.2d at 159. Such circumstances would exist where, e.g., a town restricted 
access to a facility built entirely with property tax revenue. 
21 61 N.J. 296, 302,294 A.2d 47,50-51 (1972). 
22 The court based its holding on the public trust doctrine, id. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54, 
discussed in text infra, at notes 25-40. New Jersey municipalities may not discriminate 
against nonresidents even in membership to municipal beach clubs. Van Ness v. Deal, 139 
N.J. Super 83, 352 A.2d 599 (Ch. Div. 1975). See also Sea Isle City v. Caterina, 123 N.J. 
Super. 422, 303 A.2d 351 (Crim. Div. 1973). 
23 These rights may be acquired, e.g., through application of any of the common law 
doctrines to be discussed at notes 25-92, infra. For example, when the city of Long Beach, 
N.Y. amended its charter to restrict the use of Ocean Beach Park to Long Beach residents 
and their guests, the court held the amendment, Local Law No. IX/70, invalid. Gewirtz v. 
Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 45 App. Div. 2d 841, 
358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974). The park, because of long public use, was irrevocably dedicated to 
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tion cases have been decided on the basis of state real property law. 21 
Challenges to discriminatory treatment of nonresidents are not as 
productive (except in New Jersey) as direct assertion of the public 
right of access under one of the common law doctrines to be dis-
cussed. This is true not only because most courts are willing to allow 
municipal discrimination against nonresidents, but also because far 
more nonpublic beach is held by private individuals and corpora-
tions than by municipalities. 
III. COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS TO BEACHES 
A. Public Trust 
The public trust doctrine 25 derives from the rule of English law 
that coastal waters and the land they covered were held by the 
sovereign for the common use of the people. 26 In the United States, 
sovereignty over land covered by tidal waters lies in the respective 
states. 
The original purpose of the public trust doctrine was to preserve 
all the natural water resources for navigation and commerce. Water 
resources were essential to the fishing industry and supported the 
principal means of transportation of goods. The United States Su-
preme Court articulated this doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois,27 holding that a state cannot relinquish its public 
trust in tidal waters by a transfer of the property, except where 
transfer would promote the interests of the public therein, or where 
the public interest in the navigable waters remaining would not be 
impaired. 2K The key public trust issue in litigation over coastal 
the public at large (see text at notes 41-65, infra), The possibility, not dealt with by the court, 
of discrimination at a beach which has always been restricted, still remains, however. 
21 A constitutional argument against municipal discrimination has been suggested, based 
on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Note, Access to Public 
Municipal Reaches, supra note II, at 957. Such an argument would probably fail because 
the defendant municipality need only show a rational rel'ltion of the residency classification 
to a legitimate state purpose, such as prevention of overcrowding at the beaches, or protection 
of the environment by keeping out-of-town vehicles out of the municipality. See, ex, Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Co., ~4R U.S. 4R~ (1955). 
", See also Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional 
/Joctrine, 79 YAL~~ 1, .• 1. 762 (1970). 
" Neptune City v. Avon-Ry-The-Sea, 61 N .• J. 296, 303, 294 A.2d 47, 51 (1972). 
27 146 U.S. ~R7 (1R92) I hereinafter cited as Illinois Centrall. The Court held that an Illinois 
statute granting the railroad title to the bed of Lake Michigan did not convey the fee to the 
lands. The legislature's repeal of the act was upheld as constitutional, since it never had the 
power to grant more than a license to use the submerged lands. 
2M Id. at 45~. 
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rights concerns what uses the "public interest" can be extended to 
cover. Most courts refuse to apply the public trust doctrine in beach 
access situations. The highest court in Massachusetts, for example, 
in 1961 limited the scope of the public trust doctrine to its tradi-
tional functions of promoting fishing and navigation. 29 It held that 
to claim title under the public trust doctrine in land created in front 
of private property as part of a municipal project to improve naviga-
tion or fisheries,30 the state must show a substantial and reasonable 
connection between the project and the creation of the land: i. e., 
that the project would be impaired without the creation of the 
land. 31 Where creation of a beach was found to be unrelated to the 
purpose of the project, (the improvement of navigation in a harbor) 
the court held that the adjacent littoral property owners held title 
to the new beach under the law of accretion. 32 Since the Massachu-
setts public trust doctrine does not extend to recreational use, the 
plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction to keep the public from 
using the beach above the low-water mark. 33 
Most jurisdictions agree with Massachusetts that the public trust 
in the coastal area applies only to navigation and fishing. 34 However, 
29 Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, :342 Mass. 241, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961), 
refusing to follow the dictum in Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 
89 N .E. 124 (1909), which purported to extend the public trust doctrine to include recrea-
tional uses. 
30 The commonwealth dredged the floor of Wild Harbor in Falmouth, leaving sufficient 
sand to create a beach, where none existed before, in front of plaintiff's property. 
31 But cf. United States v. Harrison County, 463 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1972). 
32 Generally, the boundary line of littoral property changes with the shoreline as long as 
the change is not due to a storm or other sudden force. E.g., Allen v. Wood, 256 Mass. 343, 
152 N.E.2d 617 (1926). 
33 In most states, private ownership of littoral property extends only to the mean high-water 
mark. In Massachusetts, under what is known as the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47, THE 
BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES 50 (1649), private title extends as far as the mean 
low-water line, or 100 rods from the mean high-water line, whichever is less, Opinion of the 
Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1974). The Georgia Supreme Court recently 
interpreted its statute defining the boundaries of private littoral property, holding that the 
foreshore is held in trust by the state subject only to adjacent landowners' right to cultivate 
and harvest oysters and clams. State v. Ashmore, Ga., 236 Ga. 401, 224 S.E.2d 334, cert. 
denied, 97 S. Ct. 90 (1976). 
" However, several state supreme court decisions contain dicta which suggest that the 
public trust doctrine protects the right to swim in public waters. The Florida court declared 
eloquently: 
Skill in the art of swimming is common amongst us. We love the oceans which surround 
our State. We, and our visitors too, enjoy bathing in their refreshing waters. The constant 
enjoyment of this privilege of using the fore-shore for ages without dispute should prove 
sufficient to establish it as an American common law right, similar to that of fishing in 
the sea, even if this right had not come down to us as a part of the English common law, 
which it undoubtedly has. 
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it may be possible to apply the doctrine to public recreational use, 
if, as suggested in Michaelson, such use can be shown to bear a 
substantial and reasonable connection to a project which furthers 
navigation or fishing. 
The public trust doctrine has successfully been applied to recrea-
tional uses of the shorelands only in New Jersey after the 1972 
landmark case of Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea.35 Although the 
Neptune court did not pass on the question of what rights the public 
has to use tidal lands and waters bordering a parcel of land in 
private ownership, it did interpret the public trust doctrine to 
require that any beach owned by a municipality be open to all on 
equal terms. The court reasoned that public rights to lands in the 
tidal area are no longer limited to those essential to navigation and 
fishing, but also include recreational uses. It stated that the doc-
trine" ... should be molded and extended to meet [the] changing 
conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit."36 Mu-
nicipalities owning beaches in New Jersey, therefore, hold them in 
trust for the general public, and may exclude persons from beaches 
no more than from offshore waters. 
The recent New Jersey decisions are clearly the minority rule in 
application of the public trust doctrine to beach access cases. Yet, 
in states where the extent of the public trust doctrine has not re-
cently been defined, it may be possible to persuade the court to 
adopt the broad New Jersey rule. This approach seems reasonable 
and consistent with the Supreme Court decision in the Illinois 
Central case, that rights in tidal lands cannot be conveyed to pri-
vate parties except to further the "public interest."37 Aside from the 
uncertainty of its application to recreational uses, the public trust 
doctrine has a further limitation in that it applies only to property 
currently or recently owned by a governmental entity. While a re-
cent conveyance or newly-established land use inconsistent with the 
public interest may be challenged, most shoreland now owned by 
private interests was conveyed by states soon after they were chart-
White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 59, 190 So. 446, 449 (1939). See also Treuting v. Bridge and 
Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 632 (Miss. 1967), discussed in The Mississippi Public Trust 
Doctrine: Public and Private Rights in the Coastal Zone, 46 MISS. L.J. 84 (1975); Hixon v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 32 Wis. 2d 608,619, 146 N.W.2d 577, 582 (1966), the most recent in 
a series of Wisconsin Supreme Court cases discussing recreational use of inland waterways. 
:\!; 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972). 
:" [d. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54. 
37 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois. 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
:I' See Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (1974). 
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ered. Since no court could return private land to a state on the 
grounds that the ancient conveyance was invalid as a breach of the 
public trust without violating Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibitions against taking without conpensation,3K such challenges 
are not foreseeable. 
A state's public trust &overeignty over coastal lands may be 
abridged not only by legislative alienation but also by the occasional 
exercise of the federal eminent domain power. While this exercise 
sometimes diminishes available beach land, as when a coastal mili-
tary installation is established, it may also serve to preserve coastal 
land. The latter was the case when a federal court affirmed the 
Department of the Interior's closure of an area under its jurisdiction 
to motor vehicles, which had been causing damage to the beach.:'D 
The court held that the taking of coastal lands as a National Wild-
life Refuge extinguished Virginia's public trust therein. However, 
even if the court had applied the Virginia public trust doctrine, it 
would probably not have been extended to protect vehicular access. 
Given the reluctance of most courts411 to extend the public trust to 
protect recreational uses, it would not make sense to argue a further 
extension of the doctrine to protect an activity which is not only 
unrelated to navigation and fishing, but ecologically harmful as 
well. 
B. Dedication 
Public right of access to a beach may be established by proving 
that an easement or fee simple in the property has been expressly 
or impliedly dedicated to the public. Express dedication may be 
found, for example, in a deed donating land to the government for 
public beach use, in the filing of a development plan setting aside 
the beach front for public use,41 or, when the land is government-
. ". Coupland v. Morton, 5 E.L.R. 20504 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1975), aff'd, 5 E.L.R. 20507 (4th 
Cir .. July 7, 1975). The federal government condemned part of the Virginia shoreline in 1938 
and the surrounding beaches were bought up by developers in the 1960's. The privately-owned 
tracts were accessible only from the north over government property, because they were 
bounded on the upland side by forest. The motor vehicle traffic, which had grown to 150 
vehicles per hour at peak periods, left the beach "worse than a plowed field," so the govern-
ment excluded all vehicles but those of neighboring land owners, and limited those to one 
trip per week. See also White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939). For a general 
discussion of the problems created by off-road vehicles, see Rosenberg, Regulation of Off-
Road Vehicles, 5 ENV. An'. 175 (1976). 
'" See, e.g., Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251,173 N.E.2d 273 
(961) and text at notes 29-33, supra. 
II Volpe v. Marina Parks, Inc., 101 R.I. 80, 220 A.2d 525 (1966). But .~ee Threedy v. Bren-
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owned, in its designation as a public beach.42 
Implied dedication may be established by showing the owner's 
acquiescence in public use of the land (indicating an intent to dedi-
cate the land), or by proving prescription, i.e., adverse public use 
for the statutory period. 43 In either case, specific permission by the 
owner to use the land for a limited purpose is a defense to a claim 
of implied dedication. Normally, a dedication must be accepted to 
be valid.44 Public use is the usual form of acceptance. This require-
ment is waived, however, when the dedicator is the government, if 
its actions reasonably imply an intention to dedicate the land. 45 
Once a dedication is proved, the public acquires an irrevocable ease-
ment over the land. 4ft 
nan, 40 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Wis. 1941), aft'd, 131 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1942) . 
• 2 Gewirtz v. Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 771, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495,505 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aft'd, 
45 App. Div. 2d 841,358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974) . 
.. Gion v. Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50,84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970). The prescriptive 
period varies from state to state, as does the statutory period required to claim title to 
property by adverse possession. In California, the prescriptive period is 5 years, in Oregon it 
is 10, while in Massachusetts it is 20 years. Before Gion, the theory of implied dedication had 
been applied only to roads. See also Hollywood, Inc. v. Hollywood, 321 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1975); 
Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 935 
(1973); Comment, This Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and its Appli-
cation to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1092 (1971). Prescription differs from adverse 
possession in that prescription operates in favor of the general public while adverse possession 
operates in favor of an individual or small group . 
.. Acceptance need not be immediate if it is made within a reasonable time and before 
withdrawal of the offer of dedication. Greenco Corp. v. Virginia Beach, 214 Va. 201, 208, 198 
S.E.2d 496, 501 (1973) . 
.. When the city of Long Beach, N.Y. attempted to close its beach (declared a public park 
by a 1936 city ordinance) to nonresidents, the court held that the 1936 ordinance had dedi-
cated the beachfront to public use. The court stated that a dedication made by a governmen-
tal entity, like one made by a private owner, is irrevocable. The waiver of the acceptance 
requirement obviated any evidentiary problems the plaintiffs might have faced in proving 
that the beach had been used continuously for the prescriptive period by nonresidents. Ge-
wirtz v. Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 771, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 505 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aft'd, 45 
App. Div. 2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974). Cf. Priory v. Borough of Manasquan, 39 N.J. 
Super. 147, 120 A.2d 625 (1956) . 
.. Gion v. Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 35, 465 P.2d 50, 53-54,84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 165-66 (1970). 
The fee remains with the recorded title-holder. The land owner receives no compensation for 
the rights lost in the land, but 
... in reality he has lost relatively little-his possibility of exclusive enjoyment of the 
property. Since by definition implied dedication requires prolonged, uncontested public 
use of the land, the lack of exclusivity must not have previously been a problem to the 
owner. He and his guests still have full access to the beach, for whatever purposes they 
formerly used it and under the same conditions of mixed public/private use. The owner 
has also lost his ability to alienate the property unencumbered by public rights, but the 
courts have found this loss to be relatively insignificant when compared to the policies in 
favor of general public access to beaches. 
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In Seaway Co. v. Attorney General,n the first implied dedication 
case to deal with public beach access, the Attorney General of Texas 
filed suit under the Texas Open Beaches Act of 1959~x to declare a 
public easement in a beach on Galveston Island in the Gulf of Mex-
ico. Section 1 of the Act declared that the public should have the 
unrestricted right of acces.s to the state-owned shores wherever it 
had acquired an easement or a right of use by prescription or dedica-
tion. Obstruction of such access was made a civil offense.~!' Section 
2 of the Act created a presumption that a prescriptive right was 
imposed on all areas between mean low tide and the vegetation 
line."O The action was brought to enjoin the defendant's construction 
of a barrier which interfered with public use of the beach on the 
seaward side of the vegetation line. 
The court could not have applied the public trust doctrine, since 
the land had been conveyed by the sovereign Republic of Texas, 
which, unlike the states of the Union, did have power to grant fee 
title to coastal lands. Rather the plaintiff's verdict was based on the 
law of dedication. The court stated that an implied dedication could 
be shown by such acts or course of conduct by the land owner as 
would induce the reasonable belief that he intended to dedicate the 
land to the public. Here, the owner's acquiescence in continuous 
adverse use of the beach by thousands of persons from 1840 to 1947 
for pedestrian and vehicular travel, swimming, fishing, and camp-
ing, was indicative of such an intent. Moreover, the county had 
manifested its acceptance of and dominion over the land by provid-
ing police patrols and expending public funds on beach mainte-
nance. Simultaneous use by the owner and others raised a presump-
tion that public use had been with the owner's permission. The 
presumption was rebutted, however, by a showing that the defen-
dant's property constituted an integral part of a road used by the 
Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common Law Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 369, 374 (1973). 
" 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Florida courts had previously recognized that a 
recreational easement in a beach could be established by prescription, Miami Beach v. Miami 
Beach Improvement Co., 14 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1943). 
" VERNON'S ANN. CIV. STAT., art. 5415d, § 1 et seq. (1962). The Act is intended to provide 
a quick and effective means by which public representatives may seek removal of structures 
blocking beach access while owners may challenge infringement of their ownership rights, 
Gulf Holding Corp. v. Brazoria County, 497 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
" In 1969 the Texas legislature enacted a penalty of $10 to $200 per day for making any 
oral or written communication that a public beach is private property. VERNON'S ANN. CIV. 
STAT., art. 5415d-2 (Supp. 1975). 
,.11 VERNON'S ANN. CIV. STAT., art. 5415d, § 2 (1962). 
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general public without permission. The finding of implied dedica-
tion made it unnecessary for the court to use the Section 2 presump-
tion of a prescriptive right, which includes by definition a presump-
tion of adverse public use. 51 
The California Supreme Court, in Gion v. Santa Cruz,52 was the 
first to actually rely on a presumption of adverse public use to 
establish the dedication of a private beach. Once any public use was 
established, the burden shifted to the fee owner to produce evidence 
that the use of his property was permissive. When this burden was 
not satisfied, the court held that the dedicated easement gave the 
public the right to use the land for parking and recreational pur-
poses, and allowed the city to police the land and practice erosion 
control. The city was forbidden, however, to erect any permanent 
structures which would interfere with the owner's remaining interest 
in the land. 
Another important aspect of dedication, its irrevocability once 
completed, was demonstrated in Dietz v. King,53 the companion 
case to Gion. In Dietz, the court found that prescriptive use had 
occurred continuously over a period of more than 100 years prior to 
the current owners' purchase of the beach and subsequent attempts 
to restrict public access. Although these owners never approved or 
acquiesced in public use of the land, the court found that a dedica-
tion had already taken place, and that the land was purchased 
subject to an unrecorded recreational easement in favor of the pub-
lic. 
Gion and Dietz demonstrate the difficulty faced by land owners 
in overcoming the presumption of permissive public use of beach 
property. However, the decisions ultimately did not result in an 
increase in the number of accessible public beaches. The shifting 
burden of Gion and irrevocability of Dietz caused a backlash among 
private beach owners, some of whom closed previously open beaches 
in order to protect their private property interests.54 The California 
" The defendant argued that Section 2 of the Act was an unconstitutional taking without 
compensation, because it created a presumption of prescriptive right or easement in favor of 
public access to the sea. The court did not pass on the constitutional question because the 
plaintiff Attorney General did not rely on the presumption to establish the easement. Seaway 
Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also text at notes 
115-20, infra. 
" 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Gion]. 
'" [d. [hereinafter cited as Dietz]. 
" On the Palos Verdes peninsula in Los Angeles County, major land owners have ... 
erected a 7-foot high fence topped by three strands of barbed wire in order to keep the 
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legislature also took prompt action by statutorily abolishing the 
common law rule of implied dedication, thus preventing any claims 
of public prescriptive right from ripening after 1972.55 
It should be noted that mere evidence of public use is not suffi-
cient to prove a dedication where other elements of the doctrine are 
missing. For instance, the. court in State Highway Commission v. 
Bauman,56 found that the upland owner had made a bona fide effort 
to bar access to her property, and thus declined to declare an ease-
ment in a private sand dune. Witnesses for the defendant-owner 
rebutted the state's contention of prior public use of the dune, and 
testified that the owner had acted to keep the public from using or 
crossing the property by posting signs, erecting barriers, and eject-
ing trespassers with the aid of the police. Further, there had never 
been any governmental involvement in public use of her property. 
The court, in finding for the land owner, held that there must be 
"clear and positive" proof of adverse use to find public acquisition 
of prescriptive rights, as there must rest a clear and unequivocal 
manifestation of intent to devote the property to public use to find 
an express dedication. The state in Bauman failed to prove adverse 
use or intent to dedicate the court's strict standard. First, in the 
absence of any overt act of dedication by the state, sale of the 
property into private ownership precluded any finding of state in-
tent to dedicate to public use. Next, the present owners showed a 
clear lack of intent to dedicate. Finally, there was no continuous 
adverse use for the prescriptive period. Continuous adverse use for 
ten years at any time since the land was first platted in 1890 would 
have been enough to establish an implied dedication to public use 
by the owner, since a completed dedication is irrevocableY 
public from reaching the beach by crossing their property. It is believed that other owners 
in that area have dynamited paths leading to the water. In Orange County, one land owner 
has erected a large fence with cactus planted at its base to discourage barefoot access to 
the beach over his property. Land formerly used for parking and beach access in San 
Mateo County is being vigorously plowed to deter unauthorized users. Parts of Sonoma 
County are beginning to look like the beaches of Normandy in 1944, complete with tank 
traps: automobile transmissions have been planted in the ground to stop vehicular access. 
Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last-At Least They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa 
Cruz, 8 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 75 (1971), quoting Fradkin, Owners of Waterway Property Rush· 
ing to Block Access Paths, Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1970 pt. III, at 25, col. 1, and Fences 
Go Up to Keep Public From Beaches, Los Angeles Times, March 21, 1971, § C at 1, col. 6. 
" CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1009 (Supp. 1975). Claims may still be brought in cases where the 
requirements for an implied dedication were completed before 1972. 
, .. 16 Ore. App. 275, 517 P.2d 1202 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bauman]. 
57 E.g., Dietz v. King, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50,84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970). See text at note 
53, supra. 
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The factual situation in Bauman was thus beyond the scope of the 
dedication doctrine. Unlike Seaway and Cion, in which the land-
owners' lack of attention to the public use of the beaches resulted 
in the dedication of an easement, the land owner in Bauman made 
a bona fide effort to keep the public from using her property. Addi-
tionally, she was not faced with the presumption of adverse use, as 
were the landowners in Cion. 
Even where adverse public use continues for the prescriptive pe-
riod, a dedication may not take place when the number of persons 
using a beach is not sufficiently great to put the owner on notice that 
his property is in jeopardy of being dedicated. In County of Orange 
v. Chandler-Sherman Corp., 58 a lower California court held that use 
of an isolated beach by 12 to 15 persons over a 36-year period was 
insufficient to establish implied dedication. The court distinguished 
this situation from Cion and Dietz in that no "substantial numbers" 
of people ever used the defendant's beach and no government was 
involved in its maintenance. It suggested that a line must be drawn 
between use by a single person once a year and daily use by 
hundreds with attendant provision of municipal services. 
The decision in Chandler-Sherman is subject to criticism on the 
grounds that the extent of public use of private property has never 
been an aspect of the theory of dedication. Dedication has always 
required only continuous adverse use for some minimum term. 
Where adverse use by one person for the prescriptive period over-
comes the landowner's rights by adverse possession and adverse use 
by hundreds alienates his rights by prescription, it is certainly 
anomalous to hold that the landowner retains his rights in cases of 
use by 12 to 15 persons. 
It would be most unfortunate if the Chandler-Sherman decision 
reflected an emerging judicial trend away from beach dedication. 
For those concerned that developers will eventually buy up most of 
the available beach land and exclude the general public,59 two re-
cent Maryland cases are cause for alarm. The state supreme court, 
in Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor and Council60 and 
Department of Natural Resources v. Cropper,61 showed its reluct-
" 54 Cal. App. 3d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 765, 768 (1976). 
" See, e.!?, Comment, Recreational Land Subdivisions as Investment Contract Securities, 
1:3 HOUSTON L. REV, 153, 154 (1975). 
'" 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975). 
" 274 Md. 25, 332 A.2d 644 (1975), decided the same day as Mayor and Council. In each 
case, plaintiffs, claiming implied dedication of the beachfront through long public use, sought 
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ance to find an implied dedication of oceanfront property to the 
public. Although the court's rejection of claims of express dedica-
tion and prescription was supported by the facts,62 a predisposition 
to favor private over public rights is apparent from the following 
language dismissing the plaintiff's public trust argument: 
Intriguing as these questions are, we find it unnecessary to consider 
them in this case for a very simple reason. What the petitioners are 
attempting to do here, under an assertion of the public's right to picnic 
and sunbathe on the dune, is to deny the Developer a use of his property 
to which he has an otherwise lawful right .... 83 
The effect of the court's predisposition can be seen in its failure 
to even consider, as did the dissenting justice, the possibility that 
there could be an implied dedication without fulfillment of the fac-
tual requirements of prescription.84 
In summary, despite varying judicial applications and differences 
in the length of the prescriptive period, the dedication doctrine in 
to enjoin construction of a condominium which would have extended past the vegetation line 
onto the dry-sand beach. The proposed construction would have narrowed the beach to the 
extent that it might be completely covered at high tide, effectively denying public use of the 
beach. 
" The beach had undergone reconstruction following a severe storm in 1962. The prescrip-
tive period in Maryland is 20 years, and it was impossible to prove that a lot first made usable 
for recreation in 1962 had been used adversely by the public for 20 years. Department of 
Natural Resources v. Mayor and Council, 274 Md. I, 15, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (1975). 
" [d. at 13, 332 A.2d at 637. The court rationalized its predisposition favoring private over 
public rights with a provision in Article XVI of the state charter. This provision subjected 
the land grant from Charles I to Lord Baltimore to the reservation of certain public privileges 
which could be exercised "without notable damage or injury" to land owners. [d. at 11, 332 
A.2d at 636. The court held that denial to the land owner of a use of his property would be 
"notable damage or injury," and thus justified holding the plaintiff in both cases to proof of 
clear and unequivocal manifestation of all elements of an express or implied dedication. The 
court, in a dictum to Cropper, further added that had the issue been the public's right to use 
that part of the dry-sand beach not interfering with the defendant's possessory rights, "other 
and different considerations might well have come into play." Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Mayor and Council, 274 Md. I, 28, 332 A.2d 630, 646 (1975). Under the Maryland 
court's theory the public would have a usufructuary right (the right of using and enjoying 
the benefits of a thing belonging to another, without impairing its substance) in the beach. 
None of the beach-access cases reach this result; the Maryland court suggests it without 
explaining how such a right would arise . 
.. Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor and Council, 274 Md. 1, 15-16,332 A.2d 630, 
639 (1975). Justice Eldridge, dissenting to both cases, cited Maryland precedents to the effect 
that no particular ceremony was necessary to dedicate land to public use, and that dedication 
may be inferred from the land owner's conduct. The facts supporting a finding of implied 
dedication were acquiescence to public use from 1962 to 1974, public expenditures for clean-
ing, police patrols, lifeguards, construction of fences and jetties to protect the beach, and 
public understanding that the entire beach at Ocean City was open to everyone. 
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theory operates uniformly in all jurisdictions. It differs in this re-
spect from public trust, which is subject to varying common law 
interpretations. Also, the factual requirements of dedication are re-
latively easily met, especially in jurisdictions like Texas (and Cali-
fornia for claims ripening before 1972), where adversity of use may 
be presumed. But proving implied dedication of a substantial 
stretch of beach can be expensive. A state which authorizes its 
attorney general to bring action against landowners to establish 
public rights may find it necessary to bring many separate lawsuits 
to open individual parcels of shoreline property. Furthermore, as 
previously noted,65 the practical effect of bringing isolated suits to 
establish public rights by implied dedication may be to close up 
more beaches than are opened. 
C. Custom 
The recently disinterred doctrine of custom can be very powerful 
in protecting rights to use beaches which have traditionally been 
open to the public. A custom is a usage or practice, which by long 
and unvarying habit, and by common adoption, has acquired the 
force of law with respect to a particular locality and subject mat-
ter. 66 Unlike dedication, which must be litigated tract by tract, cus-
tom allows rights to a large stretch of shoreline to be adjudicated 
at one time. In this respect it is similar to the public trust doctrine. 
Custom, however, has the serious drawback that seven 
requirements must be met before the doctrine will apply to a land 
use. These requirements are that it be: (1) ancient-it must have 
been used so long "that the memory runneth not to the contrary," 
(2) continuous-never interrupted by private land owners, (3) 
peaceable and free from dispute, (4) reasonable considering the na-
ture of the land and the usages of the community, (5) certain as to 
extent and boundaries-the limit here is recreational use and the 
boundaries those of the dry sand area, (6) obligatory-not left to the 
option of individual land owners, and (7) consistent with other law.1i7 
Thus, the nature of custom restricts it to the "defensive" function 
" Supra, note .54. 
" E.g., Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371, 17 P. 453 (1888). See also Note, Jaffee, State Citizen 
Rights Respectinf{ Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome to New dersey, 25 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 571 (1971); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effectiue 
Judicial Interuention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
., State ex reI. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 595, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (1969), citing 1 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 75-78. 
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of preserving existing public beaches, since the first three require-
ments prevent it from opening up any new stretches of shoreline for 
public use. The defensive function of custom, however, has proven 
quite valuable in maintaining public access in certain jurisdictions. 
The landmark case of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay 6H revived the 
custom doctrine, applying it to public use of Oregon beaches. Ore-
gon, in 1967, had enacted a statute declaring its entire shoreline 
between ordinary high tide and extreme low tide a "state recreation 
area" and vesting in the state all public rights and easements in the 
adjacent land,69 subject to the rights of record-title holders.70 The 
Hays, owners of a tourist facility, appealed a decree enjoining them 
from constructing fences or other improvements in the dry-sand 
area of their oceanfront property. The trial court found, on a theory 
of implied dedication, that the public had acquired an easement to 
use the dry-sand area of the beach for recreational purposes. The 
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decree, stating that the re-
quirements for acquisition of an easement by prescription (on a 
theory of implied dedication) had probably been satisfied by ad-
verse public use for the lO-year period. But since prescription ap-
plies only to the specific tract of land before the court, and the court 
was concerned that prescription cases could "fill the courts for 
years,"71 it relied instead on custom to affirm the decree. The court 
explained its choice of rationale, the first use of the custom doctrine 
in the United States since the nineteenth century,72 as one which 
enabled the court to treat coastal areas uniformly and to hold that 
a public right to use the entire shoreline of Oregon had been estab-
lished.73 Although the relative newness of the American legal system 
has made it difficult to find usages which have existed since antiq-
uity, here all the requirements for recognition of a custom were 
present. The free and open public use of the beaches since the adop-
tion of the land tenure system in Oregon satisfied the rule that a 
custom must be ancient. The reasonableness of the public use was 
also noted by the court, which recognized that the beach could not 
be used conveniently by its owners for any purpose except recrea-
,I> 2.')4 are. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). 
" O.R.S. § 890.610 et seq. (1975). 
111 State ex rei. Thornton v. Hay, 254 are. 584, 591-92, 462 P.2d 671, 675 (1969). 
" [d. at 59,'j, 462 P .2d at 676. 
12 See, e.g, Perley v. Langley, 7 N.H. 233 (1834), recognizing the doctrine of custom, Other 
nineteenth-century courts generally felt that the United States was too new a country to 
encompass any land which satisfied the requirement of use since "time immemorial." 
" State ex rei. Thornton v. Hay, 254 are. 584, 595, 462 P.2d 671, 676-77 (1969). 
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tion, because the dry sand area is unsafe during winter storms, 
unstable in its seaward boundary, and unfit for the construction of 
permanent structures.74 Further, the public use of the dry sand for 
recreation was". . . so notorious that notice of the custom by per-
sons buying land along the shore had to be presumed."75 A federal 
district court subsequently held that this use of the custom doctrine 
was constitutional; the Thornton holding was not so unpredictable 
as to be an impermissible taking of the Hays' private property 
rights. 76 Thornton thus set an important precedent in the use of the 
custom doctrine. Use of custom to uphold the right to beach access 
has spread since Thornton from Oregon77 to other jurisdictions, in-
cluding Florida7~ and the Virgin Islands. 79 
The usefulness of the custom doctrine is limited by the need to 
prove a detailed set of facts. An Oregon court, for example, distin-
guished Thornton in State Highway Commission v. Bauman,so in 
which the state argued custom as one alternative theory. The court 
refused to extend the Thornton shoreline easement by customary 
use to property upland of the vegetation line, reasoning that with 
respect to the defendant's property, two requisites of the custom 
theory were not met: (1) the public use was not continuous, because 
there had been frequent attempts by private owners to fence off the 
land, and (2) the public use was not deemed reasonable, because 
upland sand dunes were not ordinarily used in Oregon for recreation 
or for passage.SI 
Establishment of a public recreational easement by customary 
11 [d. at ;)89,462 P.2d at 673-74. 
" [d. at 598, 462 P.2d at 678. 
" Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286 (D. Ore. 1972). An unpredictable departure from previous 
state law which does not recognize valid existing vested rights is subject to the constitutional 
prohibition against taking property without just compensation. See, e.g., Hughes v. Washing-
ton, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). Authorizing physical intrusion into 
private property is a significant deprivation of private property rights. Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974). 
11 See also State Highway Comm'n v. Fultz, 261 Ore. 289, 491 P.2d 1171 (1971), involving 
the right of private persons to build a road and revetment (rock wall) on an ocean beach. 
" Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1974), discussed in Note, 2 FLA. 
ST. L. R~;v. 806 (1974); Note, Customary Use of Florida Beaches, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149 
(1974). 
" United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974) upholding 
the Virgin Islands Open Shorelines Act, 12 V.I.C.A. §§ 402, 403 (Supp. 1974), as a codification 
of the common law customary public right to use the beach. 
'" 16 Ore. App. 275, 517 P.2d 1202 (1974). 
" [d. at 283,517 P.2d at 1206, relating to elements (2) and (4) of the custom doctrine. See 
text at note 67, supra. 
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use does not necessarily exclude other concurrent, e.g. commercial, 
use of the beach by the property owner. In Daytona Beach v. Tona-
Rama, Inc. K2 the Florida Supreme Court held that while the public 
had an irrevocable right established by customK3 to use the beach 
for recreational purposes, the owner retained all other rights in his 
land. Construction of a tower resting on a circle of sand only 17 feet 
in diameter did not significantly interfere with the exercise of the 
public easement, was consistent with the customary public use for 
recreation, and was therefore a permissible private use. The special 
nature of the Tona-Rama owner's interest in the land, promotion of 
amusement and recreation, allowed the court to decide in favor of 
the property owner without harming the public's right to use the 
beach. The custom doctrine, while not the decisive issue in Tona-
Rama, has at least been discussed and approved in theory by the 
Florida court. Tona-Rama shows, however, that even where custom 
applies, it may not preserve a beach for exclusively recreational use. 
Where the custom doctrine can be applied, it is a very useful tool 
in establishing maximum public access at a minimum expense. 
Custom, however, is severely limited by the first of its seven ele-
ments-that the use sought to be protected be ancient. This require-
ment restricts the doctrine to the "defensive" functions of keeping 
open those beaches which have always been used by the public, and 
enjoining any construction which would seriously hamper the right 
of access to the shore. The reason for this restriction is that the 
burden of showing long-standing use cannot be met in any attempt 
to open new beaches to the public. To accomplish this, other legal 
approaches must be used. 
D. Eminent Domain 
Where a right of public access to beaches cannot be acquired 
without cost to the state through the application of the doctrines of 
public trust, dedication, prescription, or custom, and no advanta-
geous purchase is possible, the government retains the power to take 
the land, or an easement in the land, by eminent domain. This is 
" 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974). 
'" The Tona-Rama court reversed a lower court finding that a public easement had been 
acquired by prescription, holding that where the defendant operated a recreation center and 
tourist attraction on the beach, public use of the beach lacked the adverseness necessary to 
create an easement by prescription. Rather than being hostile to the defendant's ownership 
of the ocean front, public use was in furtherance of his interest. But see Morse v. E.A. Robey 
& Co .. 214 Cal. App. 2d 464, 29 Cal. Rptr. 734 (Ct. App. 1963). 
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the least preferred way for a government to establish the right of the 
public to use property, because of the constitutional requirement 
that the owner be compensated for the full value of the property or 
rights taken.M~ 
County of Hawaii u. SotomuraS5 illustrates some of the difficulties 
a local government may encounter when it condemns oceanfront 
property. In addition to compensating the owner, the governmental 
entity must survey the property (taking care to observe the special 
laws which govern the shifting boundary lines of oceanfront prop-
erty), appraise land whose value may be greatly affected by specula-
tion, and face the possibility of costly and time-consuming litiga-
tion. M8 
One issue which must be litigated is the seaward boundary of the 
title holder's land. The Sotomura court affirmed an earlier 
precedentM7 by holding that the legal boundary between public 
beach and private upland was the vegetation line. RR Other jurisdic-
tions may use a different standard to determine this boundary. MY 
A second problem is locating the vegetation line.Do In Sotomura, 
erosion had shifted the high-water mark after the defendant's prop-
erty was registered. The court held that the seaward boundary of the 
tract had also shifted, to the new location of the high-water mark. 
Once the seaward boundary of the defendant's property was fixed 
at the vegetation line as of the date of the summons, the problem 
" u.s. CONST. AMEND. V, XIV . 
.. 55 Hawaii 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert. denied 419 U.S. 872 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Sotomural. See Note, Hawaiian Beach Access: A Customary Right, 26 HASTINGS L. REV. 823 
(1975). The county condemned a park site at Kalapana Black Sand Beach, a unique tourist 
attraction . 
.. Sotomura was decided on Dec. 11, 1973, rehearing denied Dec. 28, 1973, and certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court denied Oct. 15, 1974. The County of Hawaii had initiated 
eminent domain proceedings on July 7, 1970, more than 4 years earlier. 55 Hawaii 176, 517 
P.2d 57, 59 (1973). The decision is now under review by the federal district court, Sotomura 
v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
" Application of Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968). 
MM Most states agree in substance with this determination. See, e.g., Dolphin Lane Asso-
ciates v. Southampton, 37 N.Y. 2d 292,333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975). In Hawaii, 
the vegetation line is presumed as a matter of law to be the line of debris left at the upper 
reaches of the wash of waves. The land seaward of this line is held by the state under the 
public trust doctrine, applied in Hawaii since King v. Oahu Ry. & Land Co., 11 Hawaii 717, 
723-24 (1899). The defendant, therefore, was entitled only to compensation for land upland 
of the vegetation line . 
.. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine, private land grants extend to the mean 
low-water mark. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N .E. 2d 561, 565 (1974). 
'" Like most states, Hawaii considers the terms "high-water mark" and "vegetation line" 
interchangeable. 
466 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:447 
of valuation of the condemned property still remained. The defen-
dants claimed a high value for the land based on its possible use as 
a site for a swimming pool, in conjunction with another lot zoned 
for use as a resort hotel. The court was willing to consider such 
conjunctive use in determining the value of the condemned parcel, 
but refused to speculate on its future value with no evidence of a 
market for this proposed use of the land. It therefore upheld the trial 
court's lower valuation but reversed for a recalculation of the area 
of the property. The supreme court's presumption of the seaward 
boundary of the tract has been accepted for constitutional review by 
the federal district court. 91 
Sotomura thus shows that condemnation can be a slow and ex-
pensive process, involving substantial legal and administrative 
costs, in addition to compensation of landowners. Moreover, due to 
high speculative costs, such compensation is often extremely expen-
sive.92 Thus, the principal difficulty of acquiring public rights by 
eminent domain is not a legal but a practical one: the cost of con-
demning substantial areas of recreational beach property is more 
than most states and municipalities are able to pay. Thus, any 
feasible acquisition of new recreational beaches should be coordi-
nated with planning of transportation and related services to areas 
of greatest demand. Federal funding is provided for two-thirds of the 
cost of establishing and implementing an approved state coastal 
land and water resources management program by the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972.93 The Act requires affirmative provision 
for acquisition of fee or easements in order to obtain approval of the 
state management program.94 To receive federal funding, the state 
plan must actually be implemented. Thus, implementation of the 
UI Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
il2 The prices in southeastern Florida run as high as $10,000 per foot of frontage, and even 
in the most remote sections of the state's Gulf Coast, land costs $500 per front foot. Florida 
is urgently trying to acquire beachfront property for its own residents and tourists, but 
between 1970 and 1973 it could afford to buy only 10 miles of beachfront land from private 
holders. The cost was approximately one million dollars per mile. H.R. Doc. No. 25, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 25-26 (1973), quoting the Miami Herald, April 22, 1973. In 1971, the Califor-
nia State Dep't of Parks and Recreation bought one mile of beach frontage for $6 million. 
Los Angeles Times, .Jan. 31, 1971, § B at 1, col. 6. 
'" 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. 1974). The regulations promulgated by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the Act require designation of shoreline areas 
of particular concern, including "areas of substantial recreational value." 15 C.F.R. § 
923.13(a)(3) (1975). 
" 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (Supp. 1974). 
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Act should be central to the effort of any littoral state to deal with 
the public beach access crisis. 95 
IV. EFFECT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON 
PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS 
Public recreational rights in beaches are usually established judi-
cially by resort to common law doctrines because of the constitu-
tional problems inherent in legislation concerning private property 
rights. u6 Statutes may, however, serve as the source of legislative 
intent and as a possible basis for standing. The existence or absence 
of a statute asserting the public's right to use the shore areas may 
also strongly influence the way a court will use the common law 
doctrines outlined. For example, a statute protecting the public 
from municipal discrimination in beach fees influenced the New 
Jersey court in Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea97 to take a broad 
view of the scope of the public trust doctrine. That case also high-
lights the fact that beach access statutes have greater impact on 
municipal as opposed to private beach owners, because a state legis-
lature has the power to change the public use to which municipal 
land is devoted. 9K 
A. Effect of State Constitutional Provisions 
Courts have relied on provisions of state constitutions to justify 
holdings in some beach access cases. For example, the California 
constitution forbids individuals owning tidal frontage to obstruct 
the right of way to any navigable water which is required for a public 
purpose. 99 The state supreme court in Gion v. Santa Cruz inter-
preted this section to favor public access to shoreline areas, stating: 
Even if we were reluctant to apply the rules of common-law dedication 
,I> MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 6611, 120 (1975). Federal assistance is also available in the form of 
discounted prices on surplus federal land to be used for public recreation, 40 U.S.C. § 484(e), 
(j), (k) (1970), and in matching funds spent to acquire recreational land, including beaches, 
through the Land and Water Conservation Fund, managed by the Bureau of Outdoor Recrea-
tion of the Department of the Interior, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-08 (1970), and the Open Space Land 
Program, administered by the Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 42 U.S.C. § 1500 
(1970). 
" See. e.g, Opinion of the .Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N .E.2d 561, 567-68 (1974). See also 
text at notes 106-114, infra. 
" 61 N .• 1. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972). 
'" See a/so, Gewirtz v. Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N .Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1972), alf'd, 
4ri App. Div. 2d 841,358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974). 
" CAL. CONST., art. XV, § 2. 
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to open recreational areas, we must observe the strong policy expressed 
in the constitution and statutes of this state of encouraging public use 
of shoreline recreational areas. 11111 
Thus the Gion court used the state constitution as an indirect aid 
in its application of the common law dedication doctrine. 
Direct reliance was placed on the Rhode Island constitution lOI in 
Jackuony u. Powel,102 in which the state supreme court enjoined the 
city of Newport from constructing a fence between the high and low 
water marks along the boundary of its shore. Newport had erected 
the fence to keep nonresidents from using the beach without paying, 
in itself a lawful objective in Rhode Island. The court, however, held 
the statute which authorized the construction of fences 103 unconsti-
tutional, reasoning that fences would cut off the public right of 
shoreline passage guaranteed by the state constitution. The Rhode 
Island constitution thus does not grant the public an unlimited right 
to use all Rhode Island beaches, but it does at least ensure access 
to the ocean and the wet-sand area. 
On the other hand, the Maryland Court of Appeals used the state 
charter to deny any public right to use the beach for recreational 
purposes. In Department of Natural Resources u. Mayor and 
Council,104 the court interpreted Article XVI of the charter as limit-
ing the public right of access to the shores to uses which did not 
significantly injure the owner's right. On that basis it held that no 
public right to use the shores could overcome the owner's right to 
use his land for a lawful purpose, e.g., to build a condominium 
across part of the beach. While this case can be distinguished on its 
facts from the cases in other jurisdictions in which dedication was 
successfully established,105 the cited language in the state charter 
seems to have predisposed the majority to find for the property 
owner. lOG 
"''' Gion v. Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 42, 465 P.2d 50, 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 170 (1970). 
Article XV, § 2 of the California constitution was used in Lane v. Redondo Beach, 49 Cal. 
App. 3d 251, 122 Cal. Rptr. 189 (Ct. App. 1975), to develop the contours of the public trust 
doctrine. In an action against the city for selling municipal land in the shore area to a 
developer, who built structures blocking access to and from the beach, the court stated that 
a municipality entrusted by statute with tidelands is obligated to achieve the object of the 
trust, and may not use its powers to destroy its trust obligations. 
1111 R.l. CONST. art. I, § 17 (now Art. XXXVII of Amendment) (Supp. 1974). 
1112 67 R.I. 218, 21 A.2d 554 (1941). 
"'" Publ. L. 1940, c. 848. 
1111 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975). See also text at notes 57-61 supra. 
"" See, e.}!., Gion v. Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50,84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970). 
IiH' See text at notes 60-64 supra. 
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B. Statutes Providing Standing to Protect or Establish Public 
Rights of Access in the Courts 
In other cases the existence of a statutory or constitutional prefer-
ence for open beaches did not directly affect the substantive rights 
of the parties involved, but mandated that the state attorney gen-
eral or a state agency act on behalf of beach users to establish the 
public right of access against property owners. I07 This is very impor-
tant because citizens usually cannot afford litigation to establish 
beach access rights, and they may not even have standing to bring 
action when those rights are in jeopardy. lOR Further, these statutes 
express legislative support of open beaches. This support may even 
go so far as to take the form of a judicial presumption in the right 
of the public to use the beach, forcing anyone who would abridge 
that right to prove his authority to do SO.109 
C. Constitutionality of Statutes Affecting Public Access 
Legislative attempts to ensure public access to the ocean have 
sometimes included, for example, prohibiting the erection of any 
barrier which would obstruct the public's right to enter or use the 
beaches. lIo Such laws are constitutional in some states. III However, 
a Massachusetts bill declaring unlawful any interference with the 
pedestrian free right-of-passage along the shore, including specifi-
cally the use of force and the maintenance of any fence, was unani-
mously held to violate the state and federal constitutions by that 
state's highest court.1I2 Since recreational uses are not protected by 
the Massachusetts public trust doctrine,1I3 the court found that the 
bill would cause a physical intrusion into private property, consti-
tuting a Fourteenth Amendment taking of property under even the 
1117 See, e.g. State ex reI. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); Seaway Co. 
v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
"" In United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), a non-profit 
citizens' group was denied standing in a suit to enjoin construction of condominiums which 
would have interfered with public use of the beach on Sand Key. The Florida rule is that a 
plaintiff must allege an injury different from that suffered by the general public to maintain 
standing. 
III' See, e.{L VERNON'S ANN. CIV. STAT., art. 5415d, § 1 et seq. [Texas]. 
1111 [d. 
III See, e.g, State ex reI. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). 
112 Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974), discussed with respect 
to taking in Recent Developments, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 711. 
I" See Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 241, 173 N.E.2d 273 
(1961), and text at notes 30-34 supra. 
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narrowest interpretation of "takings. "114 Because it failed to provide 
compensation to landowners, the Massachusetts bill was judged 
unconsti tutional. 
The constitutional infirmity of the Massachusetts bill was in its 
establishment of an unconditional right of public access on private 
property. Such an infirmity may be remedied by substituting a 
presumption of right for the unconditional right. In 1973, Represent-
ative Eckhardt of Texas introduced a bill in Congress taking such 
an approach. liS The Eckhardt bill expressed the national interest in 
maintaining the "free and unrestricted right" of the American pub-
lic to use the beaches in any manner consistent with rights of littoral 
property owners, liS and provided that a United States Attorney 
could bring action in federal district court to protect this right with-
out reference to jurisdictional amount. ll7 It also created the rule that 
demonstrating an area to be a beach would be prima facie evidence 
that the public has a prescriptive right to its use and may not be 
excluded by the littoral owner.1lK Only a rebuttable presumption 
was created, however, which could not constitute a "taking. "liD 
The Eckhardt bill, although not as all-inclusive as the Massachu-
setts bill, is constitutional, because it does not authorize a taking 
without compensation. 1211 Enactment of the Eckhardt bill, or similar 
bills on the state level would be useful at least to preserve the 
beaches which are presently open for public use. 
V. STATE AND REGIONAL REGULATION OF BEACHES 
A. Building Moratoriums 
Where no public right can be established through common law 
theories, a building moratorium to preserve the shoreline for recrea-
tional use without immediate compensation to land owners may be 
"' The intrusion would also be a taking under MASS. CONST. art. I, pt. 10. Opinion of the 
.Justices, :l61) Mass. 681, :ll:l N.E.2d 1)61, 568 (1974). 
", The "Open Beaches Bill," H.R. 10394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), discussed in Eck· 
hardt, A Rational National Policy on Public ll.~e of the Beache.~, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 967 
(197:1). 
"' H.R. 1O:l94, 9:ld Cong., 1st Sess., § 202 (1973). 
III [d. § 204. 
"' [d. § 201). 
"' It is "extremely unlikely that there are now serious constitutional limits on the effect 
that may be given to presumptions in civil cases." C. MCCORMACK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
"~vlll~:Nn:, § :l41) (2d ed. 1972). 
12" See Black, Con .• titlltionality of the Eckhardt Open Beaches Bill, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 439 
(1974), which declares the bill to be "past all doubt constitutional." 
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desirable. If a state or local government contemplates condemna-
tion of either an easement or fee simple on ocean front property, it 
should restrict development on the property by zoning laws or other 
land use regulations. These can be useful to prevent construction on 
the oceanfront which would obstruct public access or cause perma-
nent physical damage. For instance, a moratorium on building, 
pending issuance of land use restrictions, may be invoked to pre-
serve the current ecology of the land from the effects of develop-
ment, and to retard any increase in land value based on continued 
speculation in the property for development. The courts have held 
such restrictions to be constitutional, as long as they are reasonable 
in effect and duration. 121 
Land use regulations must be restrictive enough to be effective 
but not so restrictive as to amount to an uncompensated taking by 
inverse condemnation. 122 Whether restrictions are "reasonable" or 
"undue" is a matter of judicial interpretation. The court must de-
cide whether the restriction relates to a legitimate state objective 
and whether the loss suffered by the landowner is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the amount of public benefit. 123 
121 E.g., in Housing Authority v. Comm'r, 83 Misc. 2d 89, 372 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1975), 
the New York City Housing Authority brought an action against the state for restricting the 
use of a parcel of real property which the city had condemned for use as a low-income housing 
project. The court held that a moratorium clause, prohibiting any person from altering the 
state wetlands prior to the effective date of land use regulations, was not a taking. It noted 
the danger of permanent damage to the wetlands, and the legislature's duty to regulate their 
use. Since the moratorium was reasonable both in effect and duration (slightly less than two 
years), it did not constitute a taking without compensation. Longer moratoriums have been 
sustained in zoning cases: Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 
291, 334 N.Y .S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), upheld an 18 year restriction 
on development pending the formulation of a comprehensive zoning plan. See also State v. 
Reed, 78 Misc.2d 1004, 359 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup.Ct. 1974). 
122 Inverse condemnation is deprivation of the beneficial use of private property without 
commencement of eminent domain proceedings. When a court finds that inverse condemna-
tion has taken place, it will award damages as if a formal taking by condemnation had 
occurred. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 28.3[1] & nn. 1.10-1.13 (3d ed. 1975). Building mora-
toriums are interim procedures-they must be followed within a reasonable time by measures 
to establish permanent public rights in the coastal area, or the land owner may be able to 
establish that the restriction on the use of his property constitutes an inverse condemnation. 
See Selby Realty Co. v. San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 11, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 
(1973). 
123 In Navajo Terminals v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 46 Cal. App. 
3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108 (Ct. App. 1975), the defendant commission had adopted a resolution 
establishing part of the land owner's property as a waterfront park, pursuant to a comprehen-
sive plan authorized by the legislature for the conservation of San Francisco Bay. The plain-
tiff claimed that this resolution constituted a de facto taking, or inverse condemnation of its 
property, for which it should be compensated. The court held that adoption of long-range 
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B. Subdivision Exactions 
It has been suggested that easements may be acquired by requir-
ing a developer of oceanfront property to dedicate land or an ease-
ment thereon for public recreational use in order to obtain a build-
ing permit or approval to subdivide. 124 This approach, used in Cali-
fornia,125 deals effectively with oceanfront construction, one of the 
chief threats to public beach access. 
There are two lines of cases dealing with the constitutionality of 
statutes which permit such "exaction" of property or easements for 
recreational purposes by municipalities. The more restrictive view, 
taken by the Illinois Supreme Court in Pioneer Trust and Savings 
Bank v. Mount Prospect, is that the developer may only be required 
to assume ". . . those costs which are specifically and uniquely 
attributable to his activity and which would otherwise be cast upon 
the public."126 The more liberal California view, stated in Associated 
Home Builders v. Walnut Creek, is that subdivision exaction" ... 
can be justified on the basis of a general public need for recreational 
facilities caused by present and future subdivisions."127 
Exactions requiring dedication of beach access can be justified 
under either standard. Assuming that ample public beach access 
existed prior to the subdivision, the proposed actions of the devel-
oper may cut off such access, or (by raising land values) make it 
more difficult for the government to acquire an easement in the 
future}2H Under the more restrictive Pioneer Trust standard, the 
diminution of beach access, if any, could be specifically attributed 
to construction of a subdivision which obstructed the right of pas-
plans establishing target areas for environmental regulation, including tentative designation 
of land for public use, does not constitute a compensable taking of property. But see State v . 
• Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Maine 1970), discussed in Gannon, Constitutional Implications of 
Wet/und.~ Lepislution, 1 ENV. An .. 654 (1972), and Klopping v. Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 
P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972), which holds that if a city acts unreasonably in issuing 
precondemnation statements, either by excessively delaying eminent domain proceedings or 
by other oppressive conduct, the owner is entitled to maintain an action in inverse condemna-
tion. 
121 Note, Public Acce.~s to Beache.~, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564, 567 (1970). 
12" Sec. 11546 of the California Business and Professions Code provides: "The governing 
body of a city or county may by ordinance require the dedication of land . . . for park or 
recreational purposes as a condition to the approval of a final subdivision map .... " See 
also N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 179-k, 179-1. 
I" 22 Hl.2d 375, 379, 176 N.E.2d 799,801 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Pioneer Trust). 
127 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638, 484 P.2d 606, 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 
878 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Walnut Creek), upholding § 11546 of the California Business 
and Professions Code. 
12" See Note, Public Acces.~ to Beaches. supra note 124, at 571. 
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sage to the ocean. Thus exaction of an easement would be constitu-
tionally justified as a protection of the public interest in use of the 
beach. It would be more difficult to attribute an increase in land 
values specifically to a developer in order to justify an exaction 
under the Pioneer Trust standard, but the increase could be used 
as evidence of the public demand and need for recreational facilities 
to satisfy the Walnut Creek standard. 
Recreational subdivision exactions have generally been upheld129 
by the courts as long as they have a rational relation to the need 
created by the subdivision. Statutes have been declared unconstitu-
tional when they are not sufficiently specific130 or allow exactions 
which are excessive. 131 Such deficiencies can sometimes be avoided 
by properly drafting the enabling statute and municipal ordinances. 
The other obvious limitation of subdivision exaction is that it ap-
plies only to land held by developers who intend to subdivide. 
Clearly, other means must be used to secure and protect public 
rights to use beaches held by other types of owners. 
C. Tax Incentives 
Another method of acquiring public beach access is to provide tax 
incentives to property owners encouraging them to donate less than 
fee simple interests to a governmental or charitable organization for 
recreational purposes. The type of property interest donated may 
include a conservation restriction, in the form of an agreement not 
to build on or alter the state of the land, and to allow public ac-
cess. 132 Incentives may be furnished by allowing property tax abate-
'" See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,484 P.2d 606, 94 
Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone 
County, 144 Mont. 95, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N .E.2d 
673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of Dan-
bury, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 
N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). 
,:., Ordinances requiring dedication of "at least" a certain percentage of the gross area to 
be subdivided have been stricken as not bearing any relation to the need for recreational land 
created by the subdivision, and allowing the municipality too much discretion. Frank An-
suini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970); Admiral Dev. Corp. v. Maitland, 
267 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1972). 
"" The willingness of the court in East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 
305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup.Ct. 1969), to forbid an exaction as confiscatory shows a weakness of 
this doctrine. The developer proved that allowing public beach access would diminish the 
value of his land by nearly half; thus, the town was not permitted to require that the beach 
be dedicated to the public. 
"" See Sicard, Pursuing Open Space Preservation: The Massachusetts Conservation 
Restriction, 4 ENv. AH. 481 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Open Space Preservation]; 
474 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:447 
ments, reflecting the diminished value of land from which develop-
ment rights have been alienated,133 and by the federal income and 
estate tax consequences of such a gift.134 
A property tax exemption law of this type was recently passed in 
Alaska. 135 Such a law would not constitute a taking, since it relies 
on completely voluntary action on the part of the landowner. It has 
two disadvantages, however: first, it depends on the volition of prop-
erty owners who may not be willing to trade an easement for a tax 
exemption; and second, it costs money in the form of foregone tax 
revenues. However, issuing a tax exemption is necessarily less costly 
than taking land by e'minent domain, while it accomplishes sub-
stantially the same purpose. 
Conversely, a state may repeal existing tax exemptions for semi-
private (nonprofit) organizations which restrict access to their 
beach. In Massachusetts, for example, a tax exemption is available 
only where the land devoted to public use is open to an indefinite 
number of people. 136 This classification does not seem to present any 
constitutional problems. 137 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The public beach shortage has reached serious proportions in 
some areas, notably Florida and the Northeast. With population 
increases and shifts toward the coasts, this problem is likely to occur 
in other areas as well. Numerous approaches are available to pursue 
Conservation and Preservation Restriction Seminar, 16 N.H.B.J. 310 (1975). Also see 
Renerally Comment, Acquisition of Public Recreational Access to Privately-Owned Property: 
Devices, Problems, and Incentives, 29 ARK. L. REV. 514 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Public 
Recreational Access!. 
,3:, See Open Space Preservation, supra note 132 at 495, 16 N.H.B.J. at 383. 
'''' Federal income tax law allows deductions for charitable contributions including gifts to 
state and local governments for exclusively public purposes, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(l) (1970). The 
value of such a gift may be deducted from decedent's gross estate, 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (1970). 
See Public Recreational Access, supra note 132, at 514-15. 
"'" This law is described at 25 LAND USE LAW AND ZONING DIGEST ~ 501 (1975). 
,,,. See, e.g, M.LT. Student House, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 350 Mass. 539, 215 N.E.2d 
788 (1966). 
"" The traditional standard of equal protection is applied to organizations whose exemp-
tion is reviewed because no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved. The state 
clearly has the requisite rational basis for the classification in the creation of an incentive to 
provide additional beaches for its residents. Also see note 24, supra. Where no state conserva-
tion program exists, a group of littoral property owners interested in acting voluntarily to 
preserve the natural shoreline may do so through use of mutual restrictive covenants. These 
may prohibit, for example, construction of more than one building per lot. Shorefront Park 
Improvement Ass'n v. King, 157 Conn. 249, 253 A.2d 29 (1968). 
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the quest for more open beaches; the selection of a legal approach 
must depend heavily on the law of the jurisdiction and the particu-
lar facts at hand. In particular, the common law doctrines differ 
among the states as to whether they are recognized or not, and if 
so, what effect they have and what set of facts will make them 
applicable. Each doctrine has its general advantages and disadvan-
tages. 
Custom and public trust are generalized theories under which it 
is possible to litigate rights to as large an area as the entire shoreline 
of a state. However, custom entails proof of a very detailed set of 
facts, and has only been recognized in a few jurisdictions in the 
twentieth century. The difficulty with public trust is that it is 
usually interpreted as embracing rights to use coastal waters but not 
beach areas. 
Successful proof of dedication requires establishing one of several 
alternate sets of facts, depending in part on whether express or 
implied dedication is alleged. Any of these factual situations pres-
ents a lighter evidentiary burden than does custom. Furthermore, 
dedication is recognized in all jurisdictions (except for claims ripen-
ing after 1972 in California}.13s The difficulty with dedication, how-
ever, is that it can only be proven for individual parcels of land. 
Once the process of bringing dedication suits has started, the effect 
of defensive actions by land owners, who may close off their land so 
that they can rebut any future claim of dedication, may harm public 
access more than any successful lawsuits will have helped. 
Eminent domain involves the simplest factual requirement as to 
constitutionality, simply a showing that the taking is to satisfy a 
public need and is fairly compensated, but poses difficult valuation 
problems. Also, the price of shoreline property is high, making con-
demnation of beaches expensive and often impossible for state and 
local governments to afford. The provisions of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act make this alternative more attractive, however. 
State constitutional provisions and statutes can be useful in cre-
ating presumptions, setting forth legislative policy, and providing 
standing to raise the public interest in court. However, any state law 
which abridges the property rights of land owners is a potential 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is true as well of land 
use regulations-although valid to preserve the natural state of 
"" These claims are barred by CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1009 (Supp. 1975). 
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coastal land temporarily, they cannot constitutionally alienate the 
fee holder's rights. 
Subdivision exactions and tax incentives can be effective in par-
ticular circumstances, but both methods of acquiring easements 
depend on the intent and cooperation of the land owner. Neither is 
generally applicable for use in obtaining public access to a beach 
owned by anyone interested in privacy or isolation. 
In summary, no general course of action to obtain public beach 
access can be proposed, because of the diversity of local laws and 
circumstances. The course chosen must be specifically selected to 
fit the situation. In atfempting to open more beaches for public use, 
consideration must also be given to any nonlegal obstacles to public 
access, because mere legal right of access to a beach does not have 
practical value in all instances. Access may be limited, for example, 
by unavailability of parking or transportation facilities. 13D To max-
imize the use of available, especially isolated, beaches and thereby 
ease the strain on those which are overcrowded, measures to im-
prove physical accessibility of beaches should be undertaken. These 
may include construction of new parking areas where this can be 
done with minimal environmental impact, or institution of public 
transportation to and from outlying parking areas during peak-use 
periods. Such innovative measures as providing space for bicycles 
on summer weekend trains to shore communities would also be 
helpful. l411 Most programs involve expenditure of funds, but the 
ever-increasing public use of available beach facilities indicates that 
the cost is one that people are willing to pay.l4l 
"" "Traffic and parking are, perhaps, the critical issues. Road and parking lot capacity, 
rather than beach capacity, appear to dictate beach access and use policies in many, if not 
most, situations." MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 6611, 32 (1975). 
1111 Boston Globe, April 27, 1975 at B6, col. 2. 
'" For a discussion of the policy issues underlying allocation of the costs of beach mainte-
nance, see Comment, This Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its 
Application to California Reaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092, 1125 (1971). See also M. CLAWSON 
& .J. KNETSCH, OUTDOOR RECREATION 262-85 (1966). 
